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Torts

Torts; civil rights-blind or physically disabled persons
Civil Code §§ 51, 51.5, 51.8, 52, 53 (amended).
AB 181 (Harris); 1987 STAT. Ch. 159
Existing law entitles blind' or physically disabled persons to equal3
access to public places,2 public accommodations and transportation,

and housing accommodations. 4 Furthermore, existing law prohibits

discrimination, 5 restrictions on the use or transfer of realty, 6 or the

denial of civil rights on the basis of sex, color, race, religion, ancestry,
or national origin. 7 Chapter 159 clarifies existing laws by adding

blindness and physical disability to the list of specifically prohibited
bases of discrimination. 9 Chapter 159 does not, however, require

anyone who rents or leases real property for compensation to modify,
alter, or repair the property, or to provide greater care for a blind
or physically disabled person than is provided for anyone else. 10
LJN
1. CAL. Civ. CODE § 54.6 (definition of blind).
2. Id. § 54 (blind or physically disabled persons have same right as the able-bodied to
use streets, highways, walkways, public buildings and facilities, and other public places).
3. Id. § 54.1(g) (for example, telephone facilities, hotels, places of public amusement
and resort, and common carriers).
4. Id. § 54.1(b)(1)-(6).
5. Id. §§ 51.5, 51.8 (business establishments and franchisors may not discriminate on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
6. Id. § 53(a), (b) (all provisions prohibiting or restricting the conveyance, leasing,
mortgaging, use, occupation, or transfer of title to real property on the basis of sex, race,
color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are void).
7. Id. § 51 (Unruh Civil Rights Act). All persons within the State's jurisdiction, regardless
of their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin, are free and equal and entitled
to the full and equal accommodations of all business establishments. Id. S. Existing case law indicates that the Unruh Civil Rights Act protects all persons against
discrimination. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 736, 640 P.2d 115, 124, 180
Cal. Rptr. 496, 505 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 858 (1982).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (pertaining to the Unruh Civil Rights Act); see supra note 7.
Id. §§ 51.5, 51.8 (pertaining to business establishments and franchisors); see supra note 5. Id.
§ 53 (pertaining to the use and transfer of real property); see supra note 6.
10. Id. §§ 51, 51.5, 51.8, 52, 53. Chapter 159 does not impose building standards or
construction requirements, and does not alter the authority of the State Architect. Id. § 53.
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Torts; public liability
Government Code §§ 820.9, 985 (new); §§ 910, 911.2, 911.3, 911.4,
911.6, 946.6 (amended).
AB 2616 (Brown); 1987 STAT. Ch. 1208
Under existing law a public employee' is liable for any injury2
caused by the employee's conduct to the same extent as a private
person.' Certain immunities for employees and rights of indemnity
for employers, however, are available.4 Chapter 1208 excludes members of city councils, boards of supervisors, school boards, and
governing boards of local public entities, as well as mayors and
members of locally appointed boards and commissions from vicarious
liability for injuries caused by the act or omission of the public
entity.5
Under existing law, a claim must include the following information:
(1) The name and address of the claimant; (2) the post office address
to which the person presenting the claim desires notice to be sent;
(3) the date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or
transaction which gave rise to the claim; (4) a general description of
the damages so far as they may be known at the time the claim is
made; (5) the names of the public employees causing the injury,
damage, or loss; and (6) the amount claimed if less than ten thousand
dollars. 6 If the claim is more than ten thousand dollars, Chapter
1208 does not require a dollar amount to be stated, however, the
claim must indicate whether jurisdiction would rest in municipal or
7
superior court.
Chapter 1208 excludes the consideration of any collateral source
payment' paid to a plaintiff from admission in any action for
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 810.2 (definition of employee).
2. Id. § 810.8 (definition of injury).
3. Id. § 820(a).
4. See generally id. §§ 820.2-825.6 (immunities and indemnification).
5. Id. § 820.9. Chapter 1208 does not exonerate an official from liability for injury
caused by that individual's wrongful conduct. Id.
6. Id. § 910. Chapter 1208 extends the statute of limitations to six months from the date
the claim accrues for claims relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to a person
or to personal property or growing crops. Id. § 911.2. All other claims have a one year time
limit from the time of accrual. Id. See id. § 901 (determination of when a cause of action
accrues).
7. Id. § 910(o.
8. Id. § 985(a)(1) (definition of collateral source payment). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF TORTS § 920A(2) (collateral source payment). See generally Note, California Collateral
Source Rule and Plaintiff's Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTiNoS L.J. 667

(1986) (collateral source rule).
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personal injuries or wrongful death where a public entity is a defendant.' 0 A defendant public entity is entitled to request from the plaintiff
a list of the names and addresses of providers of collateral source
payments." The public entity must provide written notice of the date
set for any pretrial settlement conference to each provider of a
collateral source payment listed by the plaintiff or identified by the
defendant. 2 The provider of a collateral source must be given twenty
days notice of a posttrial settlement conference or hearing regarding
collateral source payments. 3 At the hearing, the trial court must
make a final determination as to any pending lien and subrogation
rights, and must determine what portion of collateral source payments
should be reimbursed from the judgment to the provider of a
collateral source payment, deducted from the verdict, or accrue to
the benefit of the plaintiff.' 4 In making the determination as to the
adjustments, the court must apply the following provisions: (1) If
the court has determined the verdict included money damages for

9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 985(a)(2) (definition of plaintiff).
10. See id. § 985(b). If, after a verdict has been returned against a public entity that
includes damages for which payment from a collateral source has already been paid, and if
the total of the collateral source payments is greater than $5000 that amount must be increased
by five percent compounded on January 1, 1989 and each January 1 thereafter. Id. The jury
must be instructed as follows:
You shall award damages in an amount that fully compensates plaintiff for damages
in accordance with instructions from the court. You shall not speculate or consider
any other possible sources of benefit the plaintiff may have received. After you have
returned your verdict the court will make whatever adjustments are necessary in this
regard.
Id. § 9850). See generally Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1961) (collateral source rule excluded in actions where defendant is the source of the collateral
source benefits.)
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 985(c). Plaintiff must respond within 30 days of the request and
11.
has a continuing duty to disclose any subsequent payments received from collateral sources.
Id. Failure to respond or comply allows the defendant, upon discovery of the provider within
five years of the date judgment was entered, to request a reduction of the judgment, reflecting
the payment. Id. § 985(d).
12. Id. § 985(c). A collateral source provider is not required to attend the conferences
unless the court requests the provider's attendance. Id. Failure to comply with the court's
request will result in the collateral source waiving any rights to reimbursement. Id.
13. Id. § 985(e).
14. Id. § 985(f). No collateral source provider may collect more than the amount
determined by the court. Id. The court may not deduct more than one-half of the plaintiff's
net recovery for all damages after attorney's fees, medical services paid by the plaintiff, and
litigation costs have been deducted. Id. § 985(g). The court is under no duty to reimburse the
collateral sources if the reimbursement will create a financial hardship on the plaintiff. Id.
Once the court does determine reimbursement is required, then, unless other arrangements are
specified, the plaintiff must pay 50% immediately. Id. § 985(h). In cases involving multiple
defendants, the reduction must be proportional to the percentage of the judgment actually
paid by the public entity and must satisfy the judgment as to the portion reduced so that no
other judgment debtor will be jointly liable for the portion of the judgment reduced. Id. §
985(i).
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which the plaintiff has already received payment from Medi-Cal,
county health care, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Victims
of Crime or other nonfederal publicly funded sources of benefit with
statutory lien rights, the court must order reimbursement from the
judgment of those amounts to the provider;15 (2) if the court has
determined the verdict includes money damages for which the plaintiff
has already received payment from private medical programs, health
maintenance organizations, state disability, unemployment insurance,
private disability insurance, workers' compensation, or other sources
of compensation similar to those listed, the court may determine
what portion of the collateral source benefits will be reimbursed
16
from the judgment to the provider of the collateral source payment;
(3) for the amount of premiums that were paid by the plaintiff to
the provider of the collateral source payment; and (4) for attorney
fees and reasonable expenses incurred if the plaintiff was found
17
partially at fault.
JD
15.
16.

Id. § 985(f)(1) (the terms must be just).
Chapter 1208 does not create subrogation rights where none existed previously. Id. §

985(0(2).
17. Id. § 985(0. The judgment will be reduced by a percentage equal to the percentage
of the entire judgment owed in attorney fees and reasonable costs. Id. § 985(f)(3)(C). The
judgment will be decreased by the same percentage as the entire judgment is reduced to take
into account the plaintiff's comparative fault. Id. § 985(f)(3)(A).
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Torts; Civil Liability Reform Act of 1987
Business and Professions Code § 6146 (amended); Civil Code §§
1714.5, 2860 (new); §§ 3294, 3295 (amended); Code of Civil
Procedure § 425.13 (new).
SB 241 (W. Brown & Lockyer); 1987 STAT. Ch. 1498
Redefines "malice" and "oppression" and provides that punitive
damages must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, immunizes
manufacturers and retailers of inherently unsafe products from liability, codifies an insured's right to independent counsel if a conflict
of interest arises, and raises contingency fee limits in medical malpractice cases.
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Existing law provides that a plaintiff may recover punitive damages'
for breach of an obligation not arising from a contract if the
defendant is guilty of fraud, 2 oppression, 3 or malice. 4 Prior law
1. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294(a) (exemplary or punitive damages are awarded for the sake
of example and to punish the defendant).
2. See id. § 3294(c)(3) (definition of fraud). E.g., Miller v. National Am. Life Ins. Co.,
54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 336-39, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731, 733-35 (1976) (evidence sustained verdict of
fraud and punitive damages).
3. See 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1242, sec. 1, at 4217 (enacting CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(c)(2))
(definition of oppression). E.g., Richardson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 25 Cal.
App. 3d 232, 245, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547, 556 (1972).
4. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3294(a). See 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 1242, sec. 1, at 4217 (enacting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3294(c)(1)) (definition of malice); e.g., Kendall Yacht Club v. United Cal. Bank,
50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 958, 123 Cal. Rptr. 848, 854 (1975) (mere negligence, even gross
negligence, is not sufficient to justify awarding punitive damages). See also BAJI No. 14.71
(7th ed. & 1986 Revisions) (jury instructions for punitive damages). See generally 4 B. WrrKN,
S. aui
OF CAiwot tiA LAw, Torts §§ 848-69 (1974 & Supp. 1984) (discussing punitive
damages). Punitive damages may not be awarded in cases based on the market share theory
of liability. E.g., Magallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 889-90, 213 Cal. Rptr.
547, 554 (1985); see generally Comment, Sindell and Beyond: A Case for Imposing Punitive
Damages in Market Share Litigation, 17 PAC. L.J. 1445, 1454-59 (1986) (punitive damages in
market share litigation after Sindell). Punitive damages are inappropriate where an insured
attempts to collect punitive damages under an uninsured motorist provision if the automobile
liability policy does not specifically provide such coverage. E.g., California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Carter, 164 Cal. App. 3d 257, 264, 210 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145 (1985); but
ef. Stewart v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 104 N.M. 744, 747, 726 P.2d 1374, 1377 (1986)
(under the New Mexico statute, uninsured motorist coverage includes coverage for punitive
damages and the insured is allowed to recover punitive damages from insurer if entitled to
recover from the uninsured tortfeasor). If an agreement so provides, an arbitrator is permitted
to award punitive damages in medical malpractice claims based on tort. E.g., Baker v. Sadick,
162 Cal. App. 3d 618, 627-31, 208 Cal. Rptr. 676, 682-84 (1984). See also Devlin v. Kearney
Mesa AMC/Jeep/Renault, 155 Cal. App. 3d 381, 393-96, 202 Cal. Rptr. 204, 211-13 0984)
(appendix of cases awarding punitive damages); Betts v. Allstate, 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 70813, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 539-43 (1984) (punitive damages in the insurance context). See generally
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provided that oppression meant subjecting a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. 5 Prior
law also provided that malice meant conduct intended to cause injury,
or conduct carried on with a conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others. 6 With the enactment of the Brown-Lockyer Civil
Liability Reform Act of 19877 (Act), the defendant's fraudulent,
oppressive, or malicious conduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.' Under the Act, oppression is redefined as despicable 9
conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in
conscious disregard of that person's rights. 0 Furthermore, malice is
redefined as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to
the plaintiff, or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and
conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others."
Under existing law, the court may grant a protective order requiring
the plaintiff to produce evidence of a prima facie case of liability
for punitive damages before introducing any evidence of the defendant's financial condition or profits gained from the wrongful conduct. 2 Existing law also prohibits pretrial discovery of the defendant's
financial condition or wrongful profits unless the court: (1) determines that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will
prevail on the claim, and (2) specifically enters an order allowing the
pretrial discovery." Upon application by the defendant, the Act also
68 Op. Att'y Gen. 55, 57-58 (1985); 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 267, 275 (1982) (California Government
Code section 818 grants immunity to public entities from exemplary damages awarded in tort
pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294, or other damages imposed primarily for the
sake of example or to punish the defendant).
5. 1980 Cal' Stat. ch. 1242, sec. 1, at 4217 (enacting CAL. CrV. CODE § 3294(c)(2))
(definition of oppression).
6. Id. sec. 1, at 4217 (enacting CAL. Cry. CODE § 3294(c)(1)) (definition of malice).
7. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 1498, sec. 1, at _(Willie L. Brown, Jr.-Bill Lockyer Civil Liability
Reform Act of 1987).
8. CAL. Crv. CODE § 3294(a). The amendments to this section apply to all actions in
which the initial trial has not commenced prior to January 1, 1988. Id. § 3294(e). See generally
Thompson, An Outline of 23 California Common Law Business Torts, 13 PAC. L.J. 1, 8-12
(1982) (punitive damages allowable under California Civil Code sections 3294 and 3295).
9. Despicable means: to be looked down upon or deserving to be despised, or meriting
hatred, scorn, or loathing, or contemptuous. WEBSTER's THMD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcIoNARY
614 (1976).
10. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3294(c)(2).
11. Id. § 3294(c)(1).
12. Id. § 3295(a). The plaintiff may subpoena documents or witnesses to be available at
the trial for the purpose of establishing the defendant's financial condition or wrongful profits.
Id. § 3295(c). An order granting pretrial discovery is not considered a determination on the
merits of the claim or any defense, and may not be given into evidence or referred to at trial.
Id.
13. Id. (the court has discretion to order a hearing on the plaintiff's probability of
success). E.g., In Re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1982);
Rawnsley v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. App. 3d 86, 90-92, 227 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808-09 (1986).
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requires the court to preclude the admission of evidence of the
defendant's financial condition or wrongful profits until the trier of

fact: (1) returns a verdict for the plaintiff awarding actual damages,
and (2) finds that a defendant is guilty of fraud, oppression, or

malice.1 4 Furthermore, a claim for exemplary damages may not state
a specific amount. 15 Finally, no claim for punitive damages against
a health care provider may be included in a complaint or other

pleading unless the court enters an order allowing such an amended
pleading to be filed.' 6 The motion allowing the filing of an amended
pleading that includes a punitive damage claim must not be granted

if the motion for the order is not filed (1) within two years after the
initial complaint or pleading is filed, or (2) not less than nine months

before the date first set for trial, whichever is earlier.

7

STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Under existing case law, a manufacturer 8 of a product is strictly
liable if an article they place on the market is known to be used

without inspection for defects and the article proves to have a defect

that causes injury.19 Under the Act, a manufacturer or seller is not
See generally Review of Selected 1980 CaliforniaLegislation, 12 PAC. L.J. 596, 596-98 (1981)
(punitive damages and pretrial discovery of defendant's financial condition).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295(d). Evidence of the defendant's financial condition and
wrongful profits is only admissible as to the defendant or defendants found liable to the
plaintiff, and found guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice. Id.
15. Id. § 3295(e). The amendments to this section apply to all actions in which the original
trial has not commenced prior to January 1, 1988. Id. § 3295(0. Cf. In Re Beck Indus., Inc.,
725 F.2d 880, 890-91 (2nd Cir. 1984) (New York law forbids evidence of a defendant's wealth
to be brought out at trial unless and until a jury has returned a special verdict that the
plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages).
16. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 425.13. The court may allow the filing of an amended
pleading claiming punitive damages on the basis of supporting and opposing affidavits presented
if the plaintiff establishes that there is a substantial probability that the plaintiff will prevail
on the punitive damages claim pursuant to California Civil Code section 3294. Id.
17. Id.
18. See 4 B. Wrricn, SuinLtRY OF CA~imoRNiA LAw, Torts §§ 819-825A (1974 & Supp.
1984) (concerning persons liable under scope of strict products liability).
19. E.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 700 (1963); see Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-35, 501 P.2d
1153, 1161-62, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442-43 (1972) (a plaintiff need only prove the existence of
a defect and that the defect proximately caused her injury because the unreasonably dangerous
requirement is unnecessary in a strict products liability action); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (proof of a defect in strict products
liability cases); see generally Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MIARY's L.J. 30, 30-35 (1973) (suggests that Cronin adds to the uncertainty of proving defects).
See generally Comment, PrescriptionDrugs and Strict Liability: The Flaw in the Ointment,
19 PAC. L.J. 193, 203-05 (1987) (discussing Brown v. Superior Court, 182 Cal. App. 3d 1125,
227 Cal. Rptr. 768, review granted, 723 P.2d 1248, 229 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1986), and the
REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS section 402A comment k). A product may be found defective
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liable in a product liability action 20 if: (1) the product sold is

inherently unsafe, (2) the product is known to be unsafe by the
ordinary consumer with the ordinary knowledge common to the

community, and (3) the product is a common consumer product
intended for personal consumption, such as sugar, castor oil, alcohol,

tobacco, and butter.2'

in design under two alternative theories: (1) if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed
to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner; or (2) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product's design
proximately caused her injury and the defendant fails to establish, in light of relevant factors,
that the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the dangers inherent in the design. Barker,
20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 455-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237; accord Caterpillar Tractor
Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885 (Alaska 1979), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, and remanded,
624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981) (following Barker analysis); contra Vineyard v. Empire Mach.
Co., 119 Ariz. 502, 581 P.2d 1152 (1978); Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 412, 462
N.E.2d 273, 278 (1984); Kallio v. Ford Motor Co.,
-.Minn. __, 407 N.W.2d 92, 95-97, 55
U.S.L.W. 860 (1987). See also BAJI No. 9.00.5 (7th ed. & 1986 Revisions) (jury instructions
for design defects). See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367-71 (1965) (illustrating the inherent difficulties in
the defectiveness standard); 4 B. WrrmIN, S?.itARY OF CALIrORA LAW, Torts §§ 816-816D
(1974 & Supp. 1984) (regarding design defects). A defect in the manufacture of a product
exists if the product differs from the manufacturer's intended result or differs from identical
products from the same manufacturer. E.g., Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
735-43, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 384-91 (1978) (applying comparative
negligence principles to strict liability cases); Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal.
App. 3d 570, 586, 97 Cal. Rptr. 798, 808-09 (1971); but cf. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc.,
715 S.W.2d 491 (1986); Bowling v. Hell Co., 31 Ohio St. 3d 277, 511 N.E.2d 373, 31 Ohio
B. 553 (1987); Staymates v. ITT Holub Indus., __-Pa. Super. -,
527 A.2d 140 (1987). See
also BAJI 9.00.3 (7th ed. & 1986 Revisions) (jury instructions for manufacturing defects). See
generally 4 B. WVmn~N, SuIMARY OF CALFORNiA LAv, Torts § 815 (1974 & Supp. 1984)
(discussing production defects). A defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer may result if a seller has reason to anticipate dangers from a product's particular
use and the seller falls to give an adequate warning. E.g., Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal.
3d 691, 699-703, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 874-76 (1984); Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories, 172 Cal. App. 3d 812, 831-35, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 465-68 (1985); Cavers v. Cushman
Motors Sales, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 346-49, 157 Cal. Rptr 142, 147-49 (1979); Canifax
v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1965). See also
BAJI No. 9.00.7 (7th ed. & 1986 Revisions) (jury instructions for failure to warn). See generally
4 B. WrrN, SUmMARY OF CALroRNuIA LAw, Torts §§ 814, 839, 840 (1974 & Supp. 1984)
(regarding failure to warn).
20. Under the Act, product liability action means any action for injury or death caused
by a product, except that the term does not include an action based on a manufacturing defect
or breach of an express warranty. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.45(b).
21. Id. § 1714.45(a)(1), (2). The Act is intended to be declarative of and does not alter
or amend existing California law, including Cronin, supra, and will apply to all product
liability actions pending on, or commenced after January 1, 1988. Id. § 1714.45(c); but cf.
Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 288, 291 (10th Cir. 1977); Dart v. Wieba Mfg. Inc.,
147 Ariz. 242, 709 P.2d 876 (1985) (rejecting Cronin's modification of the RESTATEMENT
(SEconD) TORTS section 402A). The RESTATEMENT (SEcor) OF TORTS provides that anyone
who sells a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer
is subject to liability for harm caused if: (1) the seller is engaged in the business of selling
such a product, and (2) the product is expected to and does reach the consumer without
substantial changes in condition. REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1979). The
commentators of the Restatement noted that many products cannot possibly be made entirely
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CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Under existing case law, if divergent interests are brought about

by the insurer reserving rights to assert non-coverage in a liability
action against an insured, the insurer must pay the insured's reason-

able costs incurred for hiring independent counsel. 2 Under the Act,
if an insurance policy's provisions impose a duty to defend on the
safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if
only from over-consumption. Id. § 402A comment i (1979). The article sold must be dangerous to
an extent normally contemplated by the ordinary consumer with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to the characteristics of the product. Id. Ordinary sugar is a deadly
poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture;
however, this is not what is meant by unreasonably dangerous. Id. Good tobacco is not
unreasonably dangerous because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Id. Likewise, good whiskey is not unreasonably
dangerous because some people get drunk; but bad whiskey containing a dangerous amount
of fuel oil is unreasonably dangerous. Id. Some products are incapable of being made safe for
their intended and ordinary use due to the present state of human knowledge. Id. § 402A comment
k (1979). This is also particularly true with new or experimental drugs that are marketed and
used notwithstanding the medically recognizable risks. Id. If properly prepared and marketed,
and if proper warning is given when called for, the seller of such a product is not strictly
liable for undertaking to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product
attended with a known but apparantly reasonable risk. Id. See generally Schwartz, Unavoidably
Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE
L. Ray. 1139, 1143-45 (1985) (illustrating how comment k treats known risks); Wade, On the
Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 831-33 (1973) (suggests that
the Restatement's language is potentially misleading and gives the impression that the plaintiff
must prove that the product was unusually or extremely dangerous). Many other jurisdictions
continue to adhere to the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS and require the plaintiff to prove
that the product was both defective and unreasonably dangerous. E.g., Purvis v. Consolidated
Energy Prod. Co., 674 F.2d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 1982); Two Rivers Co. v. Curtiss Breeding
Serv., 624 F.2d 1242, 1248-51 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 920 (1981); Brown v.
Western Farmers Ass'n, 268 Or. 470, 472-74, 521 P.2d 537, 539-41 (1974). See generally
Comment, PrescriptionDrugs and Strict Liability: The Flaw in the Ointment, 19 PAC. L.J.
193, 210-13 (1987) (examples of strict liability for prescription drugs in jurisdictions other than
California).
22. E.g., McGee v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 227, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424
(1985); San Diego Navy Fed. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 375,
208 Cal. Rptr. 494, 506 (1984); but cf. Zieman Mfg. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
724 F.2d 1343, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1983); St. Paul Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Roach Bros. Co.,
639 F. Supp. 134, 139 (E.D. Penn. 1986) (insurer not liable for independent counsel fees
where independent counsel was obtained because of a potential conflict of interest, insurer
paid full policy limits in settlement, and no separate interests of the insured were prejudiced).
A conflict of interest between jointly represented clients occurs whenever their common lawyer's
representation of the one is rendered less effective by reason of the lawyer's representation of
the other. Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 375. The lawyers hired by the
insurer have a duty to fully explain the implications of joint representation to both the insured
and insurer in situations where the insurer has reserved rights to deny coverage. Id. An insurer
may not compel an insured to surrender control of litigation where the insurer has reserved
rights to deny coverage, and accordingly, an attorney who jointly represents the insurer and
insured must cease to represent both parties unless the insured gives and informed consent to
the attorney's joint representation. Id. See generally Comment, Reexamining Conflicts of
Interest: When is Private Counsel Necessary?, 17 PAC. L.J. 1421, 1430-36 (1986) (suggests
Cumis and other problems highlight the need for a new solution to the conflict of interest
dilemma).
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insurer, and a conflict of interest 23 arises that creates a duty to
provide independent counsel to the insured, the insurer must provide
independent counsel unless the insured expressly waives the right to
independent counsel in writing. 24 Under the Act, the insurer's obligation to pay fees is limited to the rates actually paid other attorneys
defending similar actions in the community where the claim arises
or is being defended. 25 In addition, the insurer has the right to require
that the independent counsel selected by the insured possess certain
minimum qualifications. 26 Furthermore, if independent counsel is
selected, the insured and independent counsel have a duty to disclose
all information concerning the litigation to the insurer, 27 and timely
inform and consult with the insurer on all matters relating to the
action. 28 Finally, if independent counsel is selected, both the counsel
provided by the insurer and the independent counsel are allowed to
29
consult on all aspects of the litigation.

ATTORNEY'S FEES
Under existing law, attorneys are prohibited from collecting a
contingency fee30 in an action against a health care provider31 based
upon professional negligence 32 in excess of the following limits: (1)
Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars recovered;" (2) thirtythree and a third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars recovered;

23. Under the Act, a conflict of interest does not exist as to allegations or facts in the
litigation for which the insurer denies coverage. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2860(b). If the insurer
reserves a right on a given issue, however, and the outcome of the coverage issue can be
controlled by the counsel retained by the insurer for the defense of the claim, a conflict of
interest may exist. Id. No conflict of interest exists as to allegations of punitive damages or
because an insured is sued for an amount in excess of the policy limits. Id.
24. Id. § 2860(a) (an insurance contract may contain provisions that set forth the method
of selecting independent counsel). See id. § 2860(e) (form for express waiver statement).
25. Id. § 2860(c). Any dispute concerning attorney's fees not resolved by those methods
must be resolved by a final and binding arbitration conducted by a single neutral arbitrator
selected by both parties. Id.
26. Id. The insurer may require the independent counsel to possess certain minimum
qualifications such as having at least five years of tort litigation practice that includes substantial
defense experience in the subjects in the litigation, and possessing errors and ommissions
coverage. Id.
27. Id. § 2860(d) (this does not include privileged material relevant to coverage disputes).
28. Id.
29. Id. Any claim of privilege asserted is subject to in camera review, and any information
disclosed by the insured or independent counsel, is not a waiver of the privilege as to any
other party. Id.
30. CAL Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a) (or contracting for a contingency fee).
31. See id. § 6146(c)(2) (definition of health care provider).
32. See id. § 6146(c)(3) (definition of professional negligence).
33. See id. § 6146(c)(1) (definition of recovered).
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(3) twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars
recovered; and (4) ten percent of any amount exceeding two hundred
thousand dollars.3 4 Under the Act, an attorney is prohibited from
collecting a contingency fee in an action against a health care provider

based upon professional negligence in excess of the following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars recovered; (2)
thirty-three and one third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars

recovered; (3) twenty-five percent of the next five hundred thousand
percent of any amount exceeding
dollars recovered; and (4) fifteen
3
six hundred thousand dollars.

1

SDS

34. Id. § 6146(a). If a plaintiff pursues and recovers a non-MICRA cause of action, the
provisions of California Business and Professions Code section 6146 limiting attorney's fees
do not apply, even if the plaintiff also succeeds on a separate MICRA cause of action. Waters
v. Bourhis, 40 Cal. 3d 424, 437, 709 P.2d 469, 477-78, 220 Cal. Rptr. 666, 674-75 (1985). See
also Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal. 3d 920, 925-33, 695 P.2d 164, 166-67, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 80-85 (1985) (MICRA's provision limiting the amount of fees an attorney can collect
in a medical malpractice action is rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective and
does not run afoul of the due process or equal protection clauses), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S.
990 (1985); Hathaway v. Baldwin Park Community Hosp., 186 Cal. App. 3d 1247, 1251, 231
Cal. Rptr. 334, 336 (1986). See generally Review of Selected 1975 California Legislation, 7
PAC. L.J. 544, 549-50 (1976) (attorney's fees under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform
Act); Barnett & Rubinfeld, The Assignment of Temporary Justices in the CaliforniaSupreme
Court, 17 PAC. L.J. 1045, 1051 (1986) (raises questions regarding the make-up of the California
Supreme Court and the Court's interpretation of MICRA provisions).
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a). If periodic payments are awarded to the plaintiff
pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 667.7, the court must place a total
value on the payments based on the plaintiff's projected life expectancy and include that
amount in calculating the total award from which attorney's fees are calculated. Id. See, e.g.,
Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 154-57, 695 P.2d 665, 677-79, 211 Cal.
Rptr. 368, 380-82 (1985) (noneconomic damages awarded in lump sum and future medical
expenses in periodic payments), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); but cf. Lucas v. United
States, 811 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1987); Duren v. Suburban Community Hosp., 24 Ohio Misc.
2d 25, 482 N.E.2d 1358, 24 Ohio B. 450 (1985) (rejecting Fien's interpretation of legislative
provisions limiting fee recovery).
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